This paper examines the implications of banking competition for the interest rate channel in Eurozone over the period [2003][2004][2005][2006][2007][2008][2009][2010]. Using an Error Correction Model (ECM) approach to measure the long and short-run relationship between money market rates, bank interest rates, and our competition proxy, the Lerner index, we find that competition (i) reduces the bank lending interest rates, (ii) increases the long-term interest pass-through and, (iii) speeds up the adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium in the short-run. Therefore, competition would improve the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission through the interest rate channel, and from this point of view should be fostering in Eurozone. Because the 2007-2009 financial crisis has undoubtedly led to a modification of monetary policy and an increase of heterogeneity in Eurozone, we control and extend our results by considering many other aspects than market structure, which can affect interest rate pass-through. Even if we observe that other factors (economic heterogeneity, systemic risk, banking stability and capitalization) matter for monetary policy transmission, bank competition remains a key determinant of passthrough.
Introduction
While the European Monetary Union (hereafter EMU) will celebrate its 15 th anniversary in 2014, it is currently experiencing its deepest economic crisis since its creation. This economic crisis, whose origins lie on the financial turmoil on the other side of the Atlantic, has especially highlighted one of the major shortcomings of the euro zone: its heterogeneity. The latter, diagnosed for a long time but too often ignored, was indeed exacerbated during the crisis, reflecting sizeable cross-country differentials in terms of economic and financial conditions. The economic dimension of heterogeneity refers for example to disparities in economic growth, inflation rates, unemployment rates, or exchange rate exposure. The divergence in economic conditions within the euro zone is particularly evident between central and peripheral countries, with an ever-widening gap between economies of "North" and "South" as the economic crisis deepens. The second dimension of heterogeneity in the EMU refers to financial conditions, which are today undoubtedly the key dimension of heterogeneity in the euro zone.
Indeed, after a significant financial integration and a strong convergence in financial conditions across euro area economies from the start of EMU, the financial crisis erupted in September 2008 with the default of Lehman Brothers marked the re-emergence of differentiated financial conditions within the euro zone. Lending rates and sovereign bond yields started to diverge significantly, reflecting the sudden repricing of risks after years of accumulated fiscal, macroeconomic and financial imbalances. This renewed heterogeneity is illustrated in figures 1(a) and 1(b), which represent for ten euro area countries, over the period [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] , the evolution of interest rates on consumer loans and on house loans, respectively.
As we can see in figures 1(a) and 1(b), financial conditions tend to be more heterogeneous since 2008, with a high level of dispersion in the rates charged by banks to households for consumer loans and real estate loans, even if the divergence of interest rates appears more pronounced for house loans. According to the European Central Bank (ECB, 2012) , this significant increase of heterogeneity in financial conditions within the euro zone constitutes today a major challenge for the single monetary policy. Indeed, the financial system is the primary channel through which monetary policy reaches the economy and ultimately the price level. But, if national financial markets are fragmented, this can cause some differentiation in the transmission of monetary policy across countries and finally create risks to price stability in the monetary union as a whole. Consequently, the current divergence observed in financial conditions in euro area countries naturally raises the question of the effectiveness of the single eurozone monetary policy after the crisis (see, e.g., Blot and Labondance, 2013; Ciccarelli et al., 2013) . However, the financial crisis only tells part of the story. In other words, the existence of heterogeneous financial conditions in EMU is not new, even if the decline in nominal interest rates in all euro area countries over the two decades preceding the financial crisis tended to mask this heterogeneity on some financial market segments. Since the start of EMU, some degree of national differentiation in financial conditions exists, despite policy initiatives to foster financial integration, such as the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) launched in 1999. For example, as shown in figure 1(a), this "structural" heterogeneity seems especially strong on the consumer loans segment, with a cross-sectional standard deviation across euro area countries equal in average to 1.58 prior to the financial crash, and to 1.98 after.
Furthermore, this persistence of cross-country differentials in terms of financial conditions suggests that other factors than country-specific imbalances revealed by the crisis have certainly driven financial heterogeneity within EMU. Among these driving factors, the literature highlighted the central role of financial and banking structures (see, e.g., Cecchetti, 1999) , and more particularly the role of the banking sector competition. Indeed, we can expect that commercial banks operating on a competitive market will supply loans with lower rates and will adjust more quickly their retail rates to changes in monetary policy interest rates than banks operating on concentrated markets, because of a fear of losing market share. Given the predominantly bank-based nature of financing to households and firms in the euro zone, heterogeneous degrees of banking competition may therefore constitute a major impediment to a smooth transmission of the ECB's monetary policy. Naturally, the level of competition and concentration in the banking sector is also expected to influence the pass-through from monetary policy to deposit rates, with potential adverse effects from a macroeconomic perspective. As theoretically shown by Güntner (2011) , by amplifying changes in private households' liquidity premium, a sluggish adjustment of deposit rates amplifies the fluctuations in output, consumption and employment at business cycle frequencies. Starting from the seminal theoretical paper of Klein (1971) , a strand of the empirical literature studied whether the degree of bank competition affect monetary transmission. This literature has focused both on individual countries as well as on a cross-country level. In this second category of studies, we find in particular the pioneer papers of Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) and of Borio and Fritz (1995) , whose empirical results support the fact that lending rates adjust more sluggishly to changes in money market rates in a less competitive environment, proxied by the existence of barriers to entry. Thereafter, using different measures of banking competition, a number of studies have tried to test the effect of competition on interest rate pass-through in the euro area context (see, e.g., Mojon, 2001; Sander and Kleimeier, 2004; De Bondt, 2005; Kok Sørensen and Werner; Gropp et al., 2007) . Overall, results of these studies support previous empirical findings, by finding a tight relationship between the level of banking competition and the degree and speed of bank rates adjustment to changes in market interest rates. In a recent study, van Leuvensteijn et al. (2013) has reassessed this question by using a further measure of banking competition, the Boone (2008) indicator. In line with previous papers, van Leuvensteijn et al. (2013) found for eight euro area countries over the period 1994-2004 that the degree of banking competition is a major determinant of interest rate pass-through, a stronger competition implying a stronger responsiveness of loan rates to market rate changes.
Against this background, the aim of our study is to extend the existing empirical evidence on euro area countries by reassessing the effect of banking competition on interest rate passthrough in the context of the recent financial crisis. In other words, our aim is to evaluate whether the degree of banking competition still matters in monetary policy transmission, while there is increased evidence that country-specific imbalances have become in the aftermath of the financial crisis more important in driving financial conditions. More precisely, our paper extends the study of van Leuvensteijn et al. (2013) in at least three major dimensions. First, to take into account the potential effect of the crisis on the interest rate pass-through, we extend the study period considered by van Leuvensteijn et al. (2013) and take into account in our empirical framework the breakdown in pass-through implied by the crisis. Our study covers the period from January 2003 to December 2010 for a large sample of eleven euro area countries. Second, unlike van Leuvensteijn et al. (2013) , we use as competition measure the traditional Lerner index (Lerner, 1934) , which is a popular measure in empirical literature. Indeed despite the Boone index has better theoretical foundation (see, e.g., Boone, 2008; Delis, 2012) , the empirical robustness of this indicator remains to date unclear (Schiersch and Schmidt-Ehmcke, 2011) . Finally, in the last part of the paper, we control for the fact that rigidity in retail rates is certainly not only due to a lack of competition, but may also be due to credit risks factors and bank risk aversion. For example, as shown by Winker (1999) , in a situation of credit rationing, banks may decide to leave loan interest rates unchanged and to limit the supply of loans instead.
Three main conclusions emerge from our empirical results. First, we find that bank interest rate spreads are significantly lower under stronger banking competition. This result implies in particular that bank loan rates are lower in more competitive markets, improving social welfare. Second, from a monetary policy view, results show that stronger bank competition reinforces the long-term and short-term interest rate pass-through. Consequently, competition improves monetary policy effectiveness. Finally, robustness checks and extensions in the last section of the paper confirm that bank competition remains a powerful driver of retail banks' price-setting behaviour, despite the role played by other factors and the financial crisis.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of theoretical and empirical studies of the interest rate pass-through, by discussing especially the literature on competition and monetary policy transmission. In section 3, we document the main stylized facts concerning the evolution of banking competition within EMU. Section 4 describes our data and econometric methodology. Results are presented and discussed in section 5, while section 6 provides some extensions and robustness checks. Finally, section 7 concludes and discusses the main policy implications of our empirical findings.
Literature review
The literature on interest rate pass-through emerged in the mid of the 90s, with two important seminal papers. First, on 31 industrial and developing countries Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) show, in the majority of case, the existence of a complete long-term interest rate pass-through. However, they reveal, that the short-term adjustment is not complete, and relatively slow. Borio and Fritz (1995) , on a sample of industrialized countries, get similar results and note that, despite heterogeneity between the countries, the adjustment is an average long, near to two years. The effect of policy rate change on the credit supply could be biased by incomplete pass-through, slow adjustment and heterogeneity.
Following of these first contributions, this literature knew a growing interest, especially in Eurozone. The majority of studies have established that the pass-through is sluggish in the short-term but also incomplete in the long-term (Mojon, 2001; Toolsema et al., 2001; Donnay and Degryse, 2001; Kleimeier, 2004, 2006; De Bondt, 2005; De Bondt et al., 2005; Banerjee et al., 2010; van Leuvensteijn et al., 2013) . In addition, these studies show generally that the pass-through differs greatly to a bank rate to another. Thus, the passthrough in Eurozone is, on average, more complete and quicker for loans, short term and corporate interest rates compared respectively to deposit, long-term and household bank rates. Despite these commonalities among the different Eurozone members, the scale of passthrough remain very heterogeneous. This implies that ECB policy rate decisions affect differently the countries. Consequently, the implementation of a common monetary policy is an ardent task that the recent crisis has underlined. Nevertheless, the majority of the studies have been realized with data posterior to the introduction of the common currency. The integration of financial markets and harmonization could limit the negative influence of uniform monetary shocks. Kleimeier (2004, 2006) question about the convergence process of pass-through in Eurozone and they do not find much evidence for convergence toward the Eurozone. They note that pass-through convergence is dependent of macroeconomic and banking structure convergence.
Despite the fact that Eurozone has concentrated lot of studies, some works have explored the pass-through in other zones, or in another perspective. First, it has cross-countries specific studies (see, e.g., Winker (1999) and Weth (2002) on Germany, Manzano and Galmés (1996) on Spain, Bredin et al. (2002) and Bredin and O'Reilly (2004) on Ireland, Neumark and Sharpe (1992) on the U.S., Lim (2001) for Australia, Hofmann and Mizen (2004) for the U.K. and, Gambacorta (2005) for Italy). Second, whereas all the previous studies are based on aggregate data, few contributions have examined the interest pass-through with bank level data (Weth, 2002; Gambacorta, 2008) .
A subsidiary question relates to pass-through asymmetry. Mojon (2001) observes that the pass-through to credit rates in the euro area is higher when the policy rates increase. These findings for the Eurozone economies confirm previous works for US banks (Hannan and Berger, 1991; Mester and Saunders, 1995) , and can be explained by competition. Neumark and Sharpe (1992) indeed show that pass-through asymmetry is less important when competition is high.
The pass-through literature was not merely content to identify the pass-through. It tends also to find the determinants of incomplete pass-through. According to Borio and Fritz (1995) , four theoretical arguments can be advanced to explain the imperfect transmission process of money market rates to bank rates. First, the degree of monopoly power and the banks' markup may reduce the transmission mechanism to the extent that the effects in marginal cost are not necessarily transmits to price. Second, policy rate is a good proxy of marginal cost if and only if the costs of other funding source or bank costs are not rigid (Enfrun and Cordier, 1994; Mojon, 2001 ). Yet, an important part of cost refers to operating cost, like labor cost for example, which are in the short term rigid. Third, the consumer aversion to pay variable interest rate can also enhance rigidity and so doing the pass-through less important. Last, monetary policy efficiency and credibility could have a similar effect. Indeed, it appears that nominal price will be correct more frequently and quickly when inflation is high (Mojon, 2001) , and when the bank are confident that the change is permanent, and not temporary (Borio and Fritz, 1995) . This last argument refers to the "menu cost" (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994; Mester and Saunders, 1995) . The confidence about the future evolution of market rates is also very important because bank rates have a longer maturity than market rates. Others arguments that Borio and Fritz (1995) do not refer may influence the monetary policy transmission. Thus, when the funding cost increases, the banks may have no interest to increase one to one this bank rate due to information asymmetries (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) . Indeed, it leads to drive out good borrowers from the market (adverse selection), and, once the loans granted, it encourages the firm to undertake riskier project (moral hazard). At last, implicit interest rate insurance, offered in context of bank long-term relationship, can explain the stickiness (Sander and Kleimeier, 2002) .
In this paper, our mean interest lies in the observation of the impact of competition on the pass-through. We know thank to Monti-Klein model (Klein, 1971; Monti, 1972) extension of Freixas and Rochet that net interest margin increases with concentration or market power (Corvoisier and Gropp, 2002; Maudos and Fernández de Guevara, 2004) , but it shows also that as the intensity of competition increases, lending rates become less sensitive to change in market rates. Yet, industrial economic shows that in theory, a firm reacts more quickly to a change of input price in competitive environment. Beside this idea founded the H-statistic one of the most popular measure of competition. These conflicting effects of competition on the monetary transmission are also expressed in the literature by the opposition of two hypotheses relating to the bank pricing behavior (see, e.g., Corvoisier and Gropp, 2002) . According to the "structure-conduct-performance" hypothesis, the concentration will have a negative impact on the monetary adjustment due to collusion among banks. In contrast, the "efficient-structure" hypothesis exposes that concentration would be the result of greater bank efficiency. Consequently, the concentration (low competition) would increase the speed by which banks change their interest rate following a policy rate change. Hannan and Berger (1991) disprove this last argument in the extent that they find that the deposit rates are "sticky" when banking industry is concentrated. The concentration reduces the elasticity of bank deposit supply.
The two seminal papers in interest pass-through literature (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994; Borio and Fritz, 1995) have also explored this question, and both find that the rate stickiness is more important in concentrated and less competitive environment. Mojon (2001) finds similar results, but he adds that competition reduces the interest rate asymmetry. Furthermore, he notes that competition among financial market could also influence the pass through. De Bondt (2005) observes that this competition speeds up the monetary transmission. The impact of competition from non-bank would be important for bank-independent borrowers. The latters can finance themselves directly in the financial market, which forces banks to adjust quickly their rate and narrowing their spreads (Corvoisier and Gropp, 2002) . The financial markets and especially money market funds could also affect the adjustment of deposit rate. Indeed, in theory households are indifferent to put money in banks or in financial markets.
More recent researches tend to improve the previous results with new statistical methods and more sophisticated competition proxies. For instance, Kok Sørensen and Werner (2006) distinguish concentration to competition. Nevertheless, their two measures leads to same results: low competition and concentration reduce the speed of pass-through. It appears also that the different degrees of competition are the more plausible structural factor to explain the heterogeneity of pass-through among euro area countries. In contrast to numerous studies, Gropp et al. (2007) do not use a dynamic econometric model (e.g., VECM). Their approach does not allow testing the long-term adjustment and knowing whether the pass through is complete. It only focuses on the short-term adjustment and the speed of pass through. To proxy concentration and competition, the authors use respectively the Herfindahl Hirschman Index and the H-statistic. Despite these singularities, the results confirm previous findings of Kok Sørensen and Werner (2006) . Finally, van Leuvensteijn et al. (2013) used a dynamic econometric framework to show that competition: (i) reduces the bank interest rates; (ii) allows a more complete long term pass-through and, (iii) does not increase significantly the speed of adjustment. One of particularities of their framework is that uses a new competition measurement: the Boone indicator (Boone, 2008) .
Banking competition in Eurozone: how has it evolved?
A number of studies showed the deregulation process, coupled with the strengthening of the European banking integration, led to a marked increase in competition in the 80s. However, this process ended rapidly. The competition seemed to stagnate or even decline over 90s. Fernández de Guevara et al. (2005) found no decrease in market power, estimated by the Lerner index during the 1992-99 period. In a second contribution (Fernández de Guevara et al., 2007) , they even conclude to a declining of competition in many European countries. The period [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] , which is the period of our study, could have been marked by significant structural changes following the introduction of the Euro, but also due to measures of financial convergence (adoption of the FSAP in 1999, for instance). Furthermore, the financial crisis started in 2007 and the economic recession that followed have undoubtedly led to a change in the competition in the banking industry. banking structure and competition in Eurozone. The level of competition varies significantly from country to country. The figure 3 displays these divergences. We note that banking sectors in Southern Europe are on average less competitive than in Northern Europe.
Therefore, these basic stylized facts raise the question of convergence in the eurozone. In a recent contribution, Weill (2013) showed that bank competition has not enhanced during the 2000s, but it has converged across European countries. Besides, we confirm this process of convergence for our data. The less competitive banking sectors (Greece, Spain, and Portugal) have been faced to a greater improvement of competition than banking sector more competitive (Belgium, Germany, and The Netherlands). The figure 2(a) allows refining these findings. We note that competition in the banking system initially more competitive, decreased, while more collusive environment became more competitive. All this highlights that banking structures have converged towards a more homogenous intermediate competitive environment. 
Data and methodology
This section provides a brief description of the data and methodology used to assess the interest rate pass-through in the euro zone, and the impact of bank competition on this passthrough. Due to data availability, our study covers the period from 
Data
To assess the effect of banking competition on interest rate pass-through, we need three types of data: bank retail interest rates, a money market rate, and a measure of banking competition. For bank retail rates, we use harmonized monthly data from the MFI Interest Rates Statistics (or MIR Statistics), which provide aggregate data for retail banking loans and deposits for a large sample of EMU countries from January 2003. More particularly, it covers interest rates applied by resident monetary financial institutions (MFIs) to euro-denominated loans and deposits to households and non-financial firms which are residents of the euro area, and represents monthly averages and exclusively new business. In our study, we go beyond most previous studies on interest rate pass-through by focusing both on lending and deposit rates. Specifically, our empirical investigation considers six bank retail rates. For households, we consider the following three interest rates categories: consumer loans (all maturity), real estate loans (all maturity), and short-term deposits (≤ 1 year). Concerning the non-financial firms, we investigate the interest rate pass-through for credit rates up to one year for amounts below and over one million of euros, and for short-term deposits (≤ 1 year). Unfortunately, some data are not available for all countries in each case, or are incomplete. For example, loan rates to firms for amounts below and over one million of euros are not available for Belgium and not available on the overall period for Greece, while data on consumer loans are not available on the overall period for the Netherlands. When data are not available on the overall period, our choice of dropping or the not the country depends on the time period not covered by the database. For example, we drop the Netherlands when we study the pass-through from money market rate to consumer loans, because data for this bank rate begin only in June 2010. Concerning Greece, missing data on credit rates to firms for amounts over one million of euros represent more than fifty per cent of the total monthly observations. Consequently, we make the choice of dropping this country when we investigate the monetary policy transmission process for this bank retail rate. Concerning the money market rate variable to consider, we face a trade-off between using a short-term interest rate or a market rate of comparable maturity. Indeed, a short-term interest rate is supposed to better reflect the monetary policy stance, while a market rate of comparable maturity better reflects the marginal cost-of-funds considerations inherent in banks' rate-setting behavior (Kok Sørensen and Werner, 2006) . In the case of our study, since our main objective is to investigate the transmission of monetary policy impulsions on bank retail rates, we make the choice of employing the Euro Overnight Index Average (hereafter EONIA) as the money market rate, which is the most closely market rate related to the ECB policy rate. The majority of studies that focused on monetary policy transmission, the socalled "monetary policy approach", typically used a short-term market rate to avoid term structure of interest rate issues 5 . Moreover, as argued by Belke et al. (2013) , using the same money market rate for each bank retail rate considered makes the empirical results more comparable. Furthermore, in normal times, a close relationship is observed between the EONIA and term unsecured markets (EURIBOR rates).
However, the recent financial crisis led to a general loss of confidence in the banking sector and among banks themselves, which severely disrupted the functioning of the euro area money market and broke down the normally close relationship between the EONIA and EURIBOR rates. Yet, the short-term retail bank rates being often priced against EURIBOR rates, this disruption in the functioning of the euro area money market has certainly impaired the transmission of monetary policy rate changes to retail bank lending and deposit rates. For this reason, in the last section of the paper, we will check the robustness of our results using the 6-months EURIBOR rate as an alternative market rate. However, since our main interest is to study the impact of banking competition on the ECB's monetary transmission and not the degree of the interest rate pass-through, considering the 6-months EURIBOR rate as the market rate should not change significantly our fundamental results.
Finally, as regards the measure of banking competition, there is not a strong consensus in the literature regarding the "best" indicator by which to gauge competition (Northcott, 2004) . This lack of consensus can be explained by the large number of available banking competition indicators, each of them measuring different dimensions of competition. The literature traditionally distinguishes two types of competition measures: the structural and the nonstructural measures. The former refer to the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm and are based on the assumption that banks' competitive behavior is principally determined by the structure of the market, such as the degree of market concentration. According to this paradigm, a concentrated market structure is associated with higher prices and profits, reflecting an uncompetitive behavior. Then, among the structural measures of competition commonly used in the literature, we find for example the Hirschamn-Herfindahl index, market shares, or concentration ratios. However, this type of measures has been criticized, since higher profits in the banking sector could also be the result of a greater production and managerial efficiency, as shown by Smirlock (1985) , Evanoff and Fortier (1988), and Berger (1995) for the U.S. banking sector 6 .
Because of this limitation, a number of recent studies analyzing the competitive features of the banking industry prefer to use the non-structural competition measures. These measures refer to the so-called New Empirical Industrial Organization approach, and aim to compare some form of price mark-up over a competitive benchmark, a higher mark-up reflecting a higher market power, and therefore a less competitive environment. Numerous non-structural measures of competition have been developed in the academic literature. Among them, the two best-known are probably the H-statistic developed by Panzar and Rosse (1987) and the Lerner index (Lerner, 1934) . Compared to structural measures, the main advantage of these indexes is that they are micro-founded, and offer therefore a more realistic setting to estimate competitive conditions in the banking sector. Despite this, the empirical investigation conducted by Carbó et al. (2009) for a sample of 14 European countries over 1995-2001 indicates significant cross-country differences between non-structural measures, even if they seem to provide consistent rankings of competition at the extremes 7 . More recently, Boone (2008) extends the existing set of non-structural competition measures by proposing an index based on the efficient structure hypothesis. Briefly, this index is based on the assumption that more efficient firms (i.e. firms with lower marginal costs) gain higher profits or market shares, and that this effect is stronger the higher the competition in the market is.
Against this background, and given the large debate in the literature concerning the reliability of the above competition measures 8 , we adopt a conservative approach and choose to use the Lerner index as measure of banking competition. Indeed, despite the solid theoretical foundation of the Boone index (see, e.g., Boone, 2008; Delis, 2012) , the majority of recent studies in the literature have still used the Lerner index, except the studies of van Leuvensteijn et al. (2011 Leuvensteijn et al. ( , 2013 . Of course, this trend in the literature is principally explained by the fact that the Bonne indicator is relatively new, which consequently does not enjoy the same popularity and the same empirical robustness than the Lerner index. Beyond that, our choice of using the Lerner index is also driven by the fact that, in practice, the Lerner index is often meaningfully and statistically related with the Boone indicator. For example, Delis (2012) finds for a large sample of 84 industrialized and developing countries a statistically significant correlation between these two indicators equal to 0.46. In our case, the cross-country 6 More recently, Claessens and Laeven (2004) studied for a sample of 50 banking markets, including Europe, the relationship between competitive conditions (proxied by the H-statistic developed by Panzar and Rosse, 1987) and some non-structural indicators (concentration ratios and the Hirschman-Herfindahl index), but they did not find a significant relationship between these two types of banking competition measure (see, also, Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Fernández de Guevara and Maudos, 2004; Degryse et al., 2009) . On the contrary, Goddard et al. (2001) showed for European banking markets that the market structure seems to be an important determinant of banks' competitive behavior. 7 These differences may explain why the majority of studies in the empirical literature often rely on only one banking competition measure. The only recent exception is the paper of Delis (2012), which relies on three measures of competition: two non-structural measures with the Boone and the Lerner indexes, and one structural measure with the three-bank concentration ratio. 8 In recent years, there is a heated debate in the literature between the proponents of the Lerner index and those of the Boone index. For an illustration of this debate, see for example, van Leuvensteijn (2008) and Schiersch and Schmidt-Ehmcke (2011). correlation between the Lerner and the Boone indexes over 2003-2010 is equal to 0.79 and statistically significant at the 1% level.
Formally, the Lerner index is constructed for each bank and each year as where is the price of bank output and the marginal cost. Usually, is computed as the ratio of total operating income (interest and non-interest revenues) to total assets. is derived from a standard translog function with a single aggregate bank output (total assets) and three input prices (fixed assets, labor, and borrowed funds) 9 . As we can see, the Lerner index has then the advantage to capture both the impact of pricing power on the asset and funding side of the bank. In the case of our study, since we work at a macroeconomic level, the Lerner index represents the weighted average market power of individual banks in a given country, an increase of the Lerner index indicating less competition. Data on the Lernex index are obtained from the Global Financial Development Database of the World Bank, which provides estimates of the Lerner index for a large sample of developed and developing countries from 1996 to 2010. However, since data are provided on an annual frequency, we have followed van Leuvensteijn et al. (2013) and have temporally disaggregated data using a linear interpolation to match with the monthly frequency of our study. Over the 2003-2010 period, the average Lerner index for the eleven euro area countries considered is 17.2%, but varies across countries, from -12.4% in Finland to 26.9% in Portugal on average on the period.
Econometric methodology
Two econometric approaches predominate in the literature to estimate the pass-through from market rates to bank interest rates. The first traditional approach is based on Vector Auto Regressive (VAR) models, and aims at analyzing the effects of monetary policy shocks on bank rates through the impulse response functions (see, e.g., Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994; De Bondt, 2005) . The second and widely used approach by most recent studies consists of estimating an error correction model (ECM), or its multivariate version, the VECM. In comparison to a VAR model, an ECM has two main benefits for analyzing the interest rate pass-through. First, from a technical point of view, using an ECM does not require that time series are stationary since it can be applied to both stationary and non-stationary data 10 . This property of ECMs is particularly important when we study the monetary policy transmission process because time series for interest rates are typically integrated of order one ( ). Second, from an economic analysis point of view, an ECM is appropriate since it allows determining the long-run and short-run structures of the relationship among the variables considered. Indeed, in our case, using an ECM allows testing for both the long-run equilibrium pass-through of bank retail rates to change in markets rates (i.e. analyzing if the pass-through is complete or incomplete) and the speed of adjustment towards the equilibrium. Finally, Kok Sørensen and Werner (2006) and Blot and Labondance (2013) extend this error correction framework by using the "seemingly unrelated regression" (SUR) methodology. This panel data method, also called SUR-ECM and initially proposed by Thompson et al. (2002) , assumes cross-sectional dependencies and allows then capturing common shocks.
Hence, our empirical pass-through analysis follows the recent literature and considers an ECM framework, specified as follows for each of the six considered bank retail rates:
where , and are national bank retail rate (loan or deposit rates) and short-term money market rate (EONIA), respectively. is a constant, and refers to countries and to months. Equation represents the long-run cointegration relationship between the two interest rates, while equation reflects the short-term adjustments of bank interest rates to their long-run equilibrium. As we can see, equation
is augmented by a lagged error correction term ( ) obtained by estimating equation , which represents the deviation from the cointegration relationship. Therefore, denotes the adjustment coefficient with respect to deviations from the long-run relationship in the previous period ( ), and captures the effects of monthly change in money market rate to bank interest rates, i.e. the short-term pass-through. One would expect to be negative if the variables exhibit a return to long-run equilibrium. The long-term pass-through is captured by the parameter , and equals the mean adjustment lag at which the money market rate is fully passed through to bank interest rates (Hendry, 1995) . More importantly, this two-equation system assumes that the long-run relationship between the money market rate and bank retail rates should be unique ( ), due to a common monetary policy, but that the short-run relationship between these two interest rates may vary across countries ( ). Such a framework allows us to quantify and compare the degree of cross-country heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium 11 . Finally, following Belke et al. (2013) , we introduce in equation a shift dummy variable taking the value of one from October 2008, to account for the break in the interest rate pass-through caused by the financial crisis (Blot and Labondance, 2013) .
In a perfect competitive environment, one would expect to a perfect pass-through of market interest rates to bank interest rates at the long-run, i.e. an estimated coefficient equal to unity. Concerning the short-run, the degree of competition on the banking sector is expected to impact the speed of adjustment of bank interest rates to their long-run equilibrium, with theoretically a higher speed of adjustment in more competitive markets. To study this effect of banking competition on both long and short-run pass-through, we extend equations and by including an interaction term that is the product of the money market rate and the Lernex index: with the indicator of banking competition considered in the case of our study. Since an increase of the Lerner index indicates less competition, the estimated coefficients and are expected to be negative. This two-equation system is estimated using the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator developed by Pesaran et al. (1999) , which allows the short-run coefficients and error variances to differ across countries, but constrains the long-run coefficients to be equal across countries. Furthermore, unlike the Dynamic OLS (DOLS) and Fully Modified OLS (FMOLS) estimators, the PMG estimator highlights the adjustment dynamic between the short-run and the long-run.
Empirical results
This section reports our results for the impact of banking competition on pass-though. We start with the results of our panel unit root and cointegration tests. Subsequently, we report the findings from the examination of our ECM, by distinguishing long-run and short-run effects.
Panel unit root and cointegration tests
We first study the presence of a unit roots in our panel from panel unit root tests proposed by Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) , called IPS. The results of these tests, reported in table 2, indicates that we cannot reject, at the conventional significance level, the null hypothesis that the series are non-stationary, for all the variables, with the exception of our competition variable. However, the Hadri (2000) test, which the null hypothesis is the panels are stationary, is for the Lerner index clearly rejected. We then test for cointegration between our non-stationary variables by using panel cointegration tests developed by Westerlund (2007) . The underlying idea is to test if there exists error correction for individual panel members or for the panel as a whole. That allows verifying the absence of cointegration between the variables. The Westerlund tests realized on our long-run equations indicate, in table 3, that we can reject the null hypothesis of absence of cointegration. Indeed, the first two statistics, allows us to reject the absence of cointegration for at least one panel member, whereas the last two, which pool information over all panel members, allows us to reject the absence of cointegration for the panel as a whole. To conclude, the six selected interest rates are cointegrated with market rate, Lerner index and the cross value of these two variables. Consequently, there exists a long-run equilibrium relationship between these variables, which justifies the use of a panel VECM.
Effects of banking competition on interest rate pass-through
Tables 4, 5 and 6 present the results of the effect of banking competition on interest rate passthrough. Table 4 focuses on the interest rate transmission at the long-run, while tables 5 and 6 report the short-term pass-through results. More precisely, for each considered bank interest rate, we present estimations results of equations 1(a) and 1(b) and of equations 2(a) and 2(b), with the objective to observe the influence of competition on traditional interest rate passthrough framework.
Effect of bank competition on the long-run equilibrium
The estimations of the effect of bank competition on the long-run relationship are reported in the table 4a. Note: Standard errors reported between brackets. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Results concerning long-term pass-through lead to several striking results. First, we note that the estimated coefficients of market rate increase significantly for the majority of selected bank rates when we take into account the level of competition (with the exception of loans to firms beyond € 1 million interest rates). Consequently, the size of pass-through increases when integrating competition. Thus, a change of 1 point of money market rate will have a greater impact on bank interest rates, once we have controlled for the heterogeneous competitive environment. Furthermore in all the case that leads to a complete long run passthrough (this means that the coefficient becomes significantly higher than 1). Market structures have therefore an impact on monetary transmission. However, beyond this interaction effect with monetary policy, which we will discuss later, the competition can also act directly on the level of bank interest rates. Although the estimated coefficients of competition are significant and positive, it does not reflect the main effect of competition on bank rates. Indeed, the main effect of competition is given by . We report the results in table 4b and find mixed results. Only three bank rates are significantly impacted by competition: consumer loans, house loans and firm deposits rates. The others rates seem to be independent of bank competition. This suggests competition is not a determining factor of the level of interest rates. The price-competition could be not relevant for the banking industry or the bank market power could be not exercised on bank rates. Our preliminary findings are consistent with van Leuvensteijn et al. (2013) . However, a potential bias of these early estimations is that we calculate the main effect of competition by discriminating the crisis period with a dummy variable.
To obtain the true main effect of competition, we re-estimate our baseline model by ignoring the structural break (i.e. without the dummy crisis) and calculate . The results display in table 4b, are less mixed than in the previous case. First, three in four lending rates highlight the positive effect of competition on the level of rates. This supports the "StructureConduct-Performance" hypothesis and is in line with many studies that show that lack of bank competition leads banks to charged higher rates (see, e.g., Freixas and Rochet (2008) or Ho and Saunders (1981) models). One lending rate (loans to firms > € 1 million interest rate) is not affected by the level of bank competition. The rationale is these products are in competition with financial markets (with direct debt financing) 12 . Regardless the level of banking competition, banks are constraint to cut their margins (see, e.g. Mojon, 2001; Corvoisier and Gropp, 2002) .
In contrast to previous arguments, for deposit rates (to firms and households), we find that higher competition reduce the rates offered, while competition according to Cournot model should increase them. Some elements are plausible to explain these contradictory results.
First, in competitive market, the pressure on the loans rates forced banks to decrease their deposit rates to ensure a non-negative margin. On the other hand, our measure of competition reflects only the banking competition, which seems more appropriate for loans than deposits. The substitutability between bank deposits and direct or indirect investment in the financial markets is certainly stronger. The access to money market fund for instance is easier and does not result in entry costs. In addition, other non-bank devices also drains savings (life insurance for instance). At last, our results could support the efficient structure hypothesis. Lower competition could result a decrease in managerial costs due to increasing efficiency (Gropp and Corvoisier, 2002) . The banks should use their cost-effectiveness to offer higher deposit rates. Gropp and Corvoisier (2002) , but also more recently van Leuvensteijn et al. (2013) , find these same contradictory results.
Finally, what is more important for our purpose is that significant interactions exist between interbank rate and competition. Thus, on table 4a we note that competition indirectly affects bank interest rate through the monetary transmission. In all the case, and at a very significance level, more the competition is fierce more the long run impact of interbank rate on bank interest rate is important. Competition will reinforce the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission. By comparing the different coefficients, we observe that the competition seems to improve more the effectiveness of monetary policy for households. The main reasons are that the pass-through is initially weaker for this category of agents, and they have more difficulty to use competition to their advantage because they are more "bank-dependent". Their demand could be less elastic. Consequently, the bank market power should be higher for consumers than for firms.
Our period of study includes the recent financial turmoil. The latter has undoubtedly affected the bank rates and the transmission process 13 , because the bank faced solvency and liquidity problems, client creditworthiness downgrades with the onset of a recession, and the ECB implemented unconventional monetary policies. Our dummy crisis variable, starting in October 2008, is positive and highly significant. As expected, the difficulties encountered led to an increase of lending rates. However, the positive sign for deposit rates is surprising. We explain this finding by the need of banks for stable funding due to the crisis 14 , but also due to the implementation of Basel III.
Beyond this overall result, an interesting point is to compare the size of pass-through between the bank rates. As prior studies have shown, the pass-through of firm loans and large loans (beyond one million of euros) are respectively more important than consumer loans and loans to firms below one million of euros (see, e.g., Kok Sørensen and Werner, 2006).
Effect of bank competition on the short-run adjustment
In this sub-section, we analyze the implication of competition on bank rates short-run adjustment. Tables 5 and 6 report the results. In these tables, we distinguish two types of results: pooled and specific to each country, which we comment successively. First, the very significant negative sign for the error-correction term for all bank rates supports the use of an ECM model. It indicates an adjustment towards the equilibrium relationship, given by our long-run equation, after a shock occurs. We find also that in most cases the bank rates react very significantly in the short-term to market rate. Therefore, there is an immediate response to market rates evolutions.
The estimated coefficients of market rates allow us to proxy the short-term transmission mechanism. More the coefficient is important more the market rate will affect immediately the bank rate offered to customers. Consequently, the interaction term between the Lerner index and the money market rate would indicate the additional effect of competition evolution on short-term transmission process. Our a priori is whether the competition is increasing, the short-term monetary transmission should also increase. Our results confirm this idea in the extent to we observe that interaction term is statistically very significant and negative. The increase of collusive behaviours reduces the immediate monetary policy transmission. Thus, increasing competition allows bank rates to adjust in a greater size and faster to monetary policy shocks. We consider that the reaction will be faster because a greater part of adjustment will be immediately realized.
Note that unlike van Leuvensteijn et al. (2013) , we have not considered the competition level but the dynamic of competition, to interact with the first difference of market rate in the shortterm equation 15 . In our view, the level of competition affects essentially our long-term equation. In the short-term, the crucial factor would be the change of competition. That can be explained at a microeconomic level. For a bank, rate changes will be more important in the short-term, if the pressure on its market share increases, that is environment become more competitive. Nevertheless, in a robustness requirement, we have checked our conclusion for competition level in place of change of its, and we do not find any major change 16 . Note: For readability reasons, constant terms and the Lerner index are included but not reported. Full results are available upon request. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Note: For readability reasons, constant terms and the Lerner index are included but not reported. Full results are available upon request. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
To better understand what drive these findings, we present in the lower block of Tables 5 and  6 the individual results. Our results underline the significant heterogeneity in the short-run adjustment of the different Eurozone banking sector. A way to synthesize this observation is to compute the number of months to go to equilibrium. For that, we follow Hendry (1995) and obtain the speed of adjustment by . Table 7 indicates the different speeds of adjustment for eurozone and by countries and rates. The number of months to reach the equilibrium varies from country to country and from bank rates to bank rates. Especially, we note that adjustment towards the equilibrium is longer for household than enterprise rates. Furthermore, Greece does not seem to adjust in the short-term for some rates (firm deposits and loans to firms < € 1 million). Now, we focus our comments only on the effect of competition on the immediate transmission mechanism. We find that change of competition affects the transmission of money market rates to bank rates for the majority of rates and the majority of countries. The country specific effects are interesting in the extent to national competition varies across the time. According to our section 3, the competition has increased in some southern European economies (Spain, Portugal and Greece) while it has become lower in the others economies. Note: * means that all bank interest rates series are not available for the considered country.
In the table 8, we report for each country, the number of rates for which, the immediate transmission depends on competition. For six countries (Austria, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland and Italy), the change of competition has a significant effect on the short-term passthrough. If you put in perspective these results with the divergent process of competition among the countries, that means that monetary policy transmission has become less efficient in the short term this last years in Austria, Germany, France, Ireland and Italy due to competition decline, but more efficient in Spain where the competition has progressed. On another side, the short-term pass-through remains independent from competition in the banking systems of Finland, Greece, Netherland and Portugal. In these countries, the national competition evolution has not influenced the immediate pass through. These different findings corroborate the existence of heterogeneity in Eurozone.
Finally, in the same vein of Kok Sørensen and Werner (2006) , to assess the robustness of our findings, we plot in figure 4 the speed of adjustment presented in table 7 with the average by country of Lerner index. This bivariate analysis highlights a positive relationship for five in six bank rates. This cross-section approach confirms our results except for house loans. The more competitive the system is, the faster is the speed of adjustment. Therefore, this implies that the immediate adjustment will be more important when the competition is fierce. To sum up, our main results support the role of competition on the level of bank rates and the transmission mechanism in Eurozone. The competition reduces the rate charged and increases the effectiveness of monetary transmission in the long run. In the short run, competition also increases the immediate pass-through. 
Robustness checks and extensions
Empirical findings presented in the previous section provide evidence that banking competition matters in the transmission of ECB's monetary policy, both at the short and the long term. More important, our results show that the observed cross-country divergences in bank lending rates and monetary policy effectiveness are not only the result of the financial crisis started in 2008, but reflect also the fact that financial market structures differ across countries. However, some other country-specific factors linked to the crisis may also explain heterogeneity in lending behaviour. Among these factors, we find in particular the increasing credit risk and bank risk aversion (ECB, 2013) . Therefore, in this section, after performing some robustness checks, we extend our baseline empirical framework by including in equations 2(a) and 2(b) many risk measures to capture the risk premium in bank interest rates.
Results confirm the important role played by bank competition in driving lending rates.
Robustness checks
We check the robustness of our results in several ways. First, we test the sensibility of our results by considering an alternative money market rate: the 6-months EURIBOR rate. Indeed, as previously mentioned, bank rates are often priced against EURIBOR rates. Consequently, the 6-months EURIBOR rate is expected to correspond most closely to bank interest rates in terms of the rate-fixation period. Results are reported in table 9. We can see that our results do not change significantly when we consider the 6-months EURIBOR. This result is nonetheless consistent with the fact that, in normal times, EONIA and EURIBOR rates are highly correlated.
Second, we perform an alternative estimation of pass-through by considering a time-series approach instead of our panel approach. Accordingly, we replace our disaggregated view of euro area by a consolidated view. Thus, we measure the pass-through of EONIA to eurozone bank rates, which are a weighted average of the country bank rates used up to now. In a similar way, our measure of bank competition reflects the euro area competition as a whole. As before, the Lerner index for the euro area is taken from the Global Financial Development Database of the World Bank. Thank to this approach, we focus only on temporal evolutions of bank competition and their influence to the monetary policy transmission. This alternative approach is particularly interesting since the single banking market of the euro area has experienced a loss of competition over the last decade (see appendix A). With our previous unconsolidated approach, we did not distinguish this trend. Indeed, concomitantly, some countries have been faced to an increase of bank competition while other a decrease of it. However, we note that competition has been reduced in larger countries. In contrast to our baseline framework, this "European view" approach allows us to control for the different size of the eurozone member states. Despite the use of time series, we still consider an ECM framework, that we estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Table 10 displays the results of our estimations. As previously, we find that for the majority of bank rates, banking competition tends to reduce the charged rates. As regards the monetary policy transmission, it appears that lessening of competition has reduced the long-term and short-term interest rate pass-through.
Third, we relax our first hypothesis that the long-run relationship between the money market rate and bank interest rates is unique, by using the mean group (MG) estimator proposed by Pesaran and Smith (1995) . Compared to the PMG estimator, the MG estimator allows the long-run coefficients to differ across countries, since the model is fitted separately for each country and a simple arithmetic average of the coefficients is calculated. By providing individual long-run parameters, such an approach allows therefore to study the heterogeneity in the long-term pass-through between euro area countries. MG estimates are reported in the table 11, while appendix B details the value of long-run coefficients ( ) for each country and each bank rate. As we can see in the table 11, our results are robust to this alternative econometric approach. Particularly, we observe that considering heterogeneous long-run dynamics does not change our results on the effect of bank competition on the short-term adjustment. Indeed, similarly to results reported in the first row of tables 5 and 6, we find that competition has a significant impact on the short-term transmission process for five of the six bank rates considered. Stability of our results supports therefore our initial choice of considering a unique long-run relationship, and can be explained by the fact that euro area countries are characterized by a relative homogeneity of long-run dynamics (see appendix B).
Finally, we refine our previous results by testing whether the recent financial crisis has accentuated the effect of banking competition on the short and long-term interest rate passthrough. This empirical investigation is motivated by two main reasons. First, as our previous results showed, high levels of bank competition imply a faster interest rate pass-through. Yet, the transmission of monetary policy is essential in time of crisis, in order in particular to preserve the resilience of the economy. This implies that banking competition could become an even more important factor in times of financial and economic turmoil. We therefore expect that the recent crisis has strengthened the negative influence of lower competition. The second reason is related to the observation that the euro area countries most affected by the crisis are also those characterized by low levels of bank competition and which have known since an increase of competition, due to more severe banking crisis, which have wiped out bank market power. Among these countries, we find more particularly the peripheral EMU economies: Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Spain, and Italy (see figure 3) . To test whether the crisis has strengthened the effect of bank competition on pass-through, we interact the interaction term between market rates and competition with the crisis dummy. Table 12 presents estimations with this three-way interaction variable. In our long-run relationship, the estimated coefficients associated with the three-way interaction variable are significant and negative, with the exception of house loans. That means during the crisis, the interest passthough decreases more in low competitive markets. Issues related to banking competition are therefore more pregnant during economic turmoil. Banks in oligopolistic system can prefer to ration credit than cut their rate and margin, in order to maximize profits (or minimize losses).
In short-term, we observe negative coefficients. We interpret this finding as the fact that during the crisis, the increase of bank competition has reduced the immediate pass-through and consequently, has increased the speed of adjustment. These short-term results are not in opposite to those of long-term. Indeed, banking systems with lower competition, which characterize Southern economies, have experienced a further decrease of competition, but remains in average less competitive than Northern economies. Note: For readability reasons, constant terms and the Lerner index are included but not reported. Full results are available upon request. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Note: For readability reasons, constant terms and the Lerner index are included but not reported. Full results are available upon request. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Note: For readability reasons, constant terms and the Lerner index are included but not reported. Full results are available upon request. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Note: For readability reasons, constant terms and the Lerner index are included but not reported. Full results are available upon request. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Extensions
Southern vs. Northern euro area countries. We have estimated our baseline model under the assumption that monetary transmission is in a long-run perspective homogeneous across the eurozone countries. Here, we hypothesis a medium scenario in the extent to we suppose that EMU is split into two groups of countries: the peripheral and central eurozone countries, that we called respectively Southern and Northern countries in this study 17 . This is important because Southern and Northern countries are characterized by deep economic divergences and differences in efficiency of financial and banking markets. We have also shown in section 3 that banking competition has evolved differently between Northern and some Southern economies, but also that competition is less fierce in Southern countries. As results indicate in table 13, the distinction of two heterogeneous areas in eurozone does not change our main findings: competition increases the long-term pass-through and reduces the immediate transmission mechanism for many rates. Our results do not provide clear evidence of the existence of two different areas among EMU countries. We just note a more important size of pass-through in Southern economies for household interest rates. This certainly reflects the dynamism of household credit supply before the crisis, which leads to the creation of housing bubbles. Note: For readability reasons, constant terms and the Lerner index are included but not reported. Full results are available upon request. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Control for risk premium. Another way to control the heterogeneity of EMU countries is to insert government bond rates in our regression as risk-free assets. This is relevant because the latter explain an important part of offered rates and must transcribe structural economic health of the different countries. In the pre-crisis context, government bond rates controlled only for temporal fluctuations because the rates were in this period very closed across the countries. There was no substantial difference between EMU countries. However, since the beginning of the financial crisis, the government bond rates allow reflecting cross-section heterogeneities. For instance, the spread between German and Greek government bond yields were only of 5 basis points in January 2003 against 910 basis points (9.1%) in December 2010. By introducing this new variable, we specify our previous dummy "crisis" and take account different crisis intensities between the euro area countries. As expected, results displayed in the table 14 underline the positive relation between government bond rates and bank rates in long-run. Moreover, the more the rise of government rate is in a country, the more important is the short-run increase of bank rates. Above all, we can see that our results are robust to the inclusion of sovereign bond yields in our empirical model.
We have so far controlled for temporal and cross-country economic divergences and we note no change in the effect of bank competition on the monetary transmission. However, some others banking or financial characteristics could directly alter the monetary transmission as systemic risk, bank fragility and capital. Control for systemic risk. While central bankers supported the dichotomy between monetary policy and financial stability policy, the crisis called into question this view (Mishkin, 2011) . Central Banks are now aware that systemic risk could alter monetary policy. Interest rate pass-through could be therefore less effective through financial stress periods, namely in presence of systemic risk, for various reasons. First, at the beginning of the recent financial stress, market rates increased, due to a break in the trust between the financial intermediaries. The intensity of transmission between money market rates and bank rates undoubtedly changed. Borrower solvability and adverse selection problems prevented bank to transmit all the market rate shocks. Monetary policy actions, as drastic drop in key interest rates and unconventional policies (Borio and Disyatat, 2010 ) allowed gradually market rates declining.
The low market interest rates that resulted have not been passing entirely to bank rates. They have been used to raise interest margin, bank profitability and therefore to recapitalize the banking system (Adrian and Shin, 2010) . The graph in appendix C supports this idea because spreads of retail bank interest rates over money market rates sharply increased from the crisis.
To measure systemic risk, we use the Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress (CISS) in the financial system developed by Hollo et al. (2012) and made available by ECB. This eurozone financial indicator of stress is an aggregation of five market-specific sub-indices created from fifteen individual financial stress measures. The sub-indices represent the most important segments of an economy's system: securities markets, sector of bank and non-bank financial intermediaries, FX markets as well as money markets. Thus, the composite indicator uses for instance the volatility of money market rates. We insert systemic risk and the interaction term of the latter and the Eonia in our baseline model, respectively to capture the direct effect of systemic risk on bank rates and the effect on pass-through. Our results show that cyclical factors as systemic risk do not alter the effect of structural factor, as competition, on monetary transmission. Furthermore, we note that these cyclical factors also act on monetary transmission. As shown by Hristov et al. (2012) , systemic shocks and crisis worse the interest rate channel. However, this effect appears to be only in the short-term. In a long-term perspective, systemic risk increases the transmission channel. This finding can be explained by the fact that systemic risk constraints central bank to put in place additional measures following a crisis, as unconventional monetary policies, to increase monetary transmission. Control for bank stability. Beyond systemic risk, the stability of banking systems could also affect the pass-through. To measure bank stability, we opt for the conventional Z-score 18 . We expect that bank stability greatly influences the transmission of interest rates. Bank stability is obviously key for monetary policy. According to Mersch (2013) , "a stable financial system with sound and solvent banks supports the smooth transmission of monetary policy". Besides, the Federal Reserve combines monetary and supervisory functions since a century and European Council agreement in December 2012 19 , assigns to the ECB the banking supervisory task in the context of a banking union for euro area (Brooks et al., 2013) . In table 16 , we report the effect of banking stability on the pass-through (Z-score*Eonia). We obtain mixed results. While banking stability reinforces the pass-through for household rates as expected, it reduces the pass-through for firms' interest rates. We cannot conclude to the effect of bank stability on monetary transmission. However, considering the banking stability is important to check our main results, because it measures not only temporal banking unbalances, but also structural cross-country divergences, which could be link with the market structures. Indeed many studies have associated competition and stability (see, e.g., Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009 ). Here, we observe that our main results remain the same. The positive effect of banking competition on the interest pass-though is direct, and is not due to indirect effects through banking fragilities. Bank capital effect on bank rates. Apart from these results, we now focus on bank capital in order to measure the effect of bank capital on bank rate (table 17) . It is well known since Kashyap and Stein (2000) that bank capital is a determinant of lending behavior. That is wellcapitalized bank could continue to lend during tightening monetary policy. We expect that bank lending rates react less to bank capital in general. Our principal finding is that bank capital affects significantly both lending and deposit rates. First, low-capital banking system tend to charge higher loan rates (except for loans to firms beyond € 1 million) than well-capitalized banks consistence with Hubbard et al. (2002) . Second, well-capital banks tend to increase deposit rate rates than low-capitalized banks maybe in order to capture additional money for loans. Last, the scale of interest pass-through is influence by banking capitalization. The pass-through is more important when the banking system is well capitalized. Note: For readability reasons, constant terms and the Lerner index are included but not reported. Full results are available upon request. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Asymmetric effects.
We perform an ultimate estimation to measure the potential asymmetric effect of bank competition on pass-though. In order to measure this effect, we distinguish, when we cross the Lerner index to market rate, if the latter increased or decreased. Therefore, we have two interaction variables instead one in the long-term relationship but also in the short-term adjustment equation. Thus, we test if the effect of banking competition on the immediate monetary transmission is more important, depending on whether the interbank rate is increasing or decreasing and, whether the effect of competition on the long-run rate response to interbank rate differs, further to an increase or a decrease. In short-term, as specified in the previous section, the decrease of competition reduces the monetary transmission. Results reported in the table 18 indicate that this result is more important when the interbank rates increase. If the environment becomes more competitive, the banks pass more quickly the increases than decreases of market rates. The negative shocks for consumers (i.e. increase of rates) will be passed more quickly, which confirms the findings of Mojon (2001) . In other words, a lower competition allows smoothing temporary and unexpected rate increases. However, the difference of coefficient is not or just weakly significant, according to standard Wald tests of coefficient equality. By contrast, for long-term relationship, we observe a very significant asymmetric effect of competition on monetary transmission. As in short-term, we note that a lower competition reduces more the pass-through further to an increase of interbank rates. Note: For readability reasons, constant terms and the Lerner index are included but not reported. Full results are available upon request. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Conclusion and policy implications
This paper provides new empirical evidence on the effects of bank competition on the monetary policy pass-through for eleven euro area countries by taking into account the recent financial and sovereign crisis. The latter, characterized by sovereign debt tensions, fragile economic activity, weak capital positions and high levels of uncertainty, has exacerbated the financial fragmentation of the European Monetary Union and increased levels of heterogeneity in bank lending rates. Furthermore, as recognized by the ECB (2013), a number of structural factors may also explain the observed heterogeneity of bank lending rates within the eurozone. Among these factors, we find in particular banking competition, whose levels appear relatively disparate among euro area countries, despite policy initiatives to foster financial integration.
Against this background, the purpose of the present study was to analyze whether, in a context of financial heterogeneity, competition in the banking industry has remained a powerful driver of retail banks' price-setting behaviour. For this purpose, we extended standard pass-through models in two ways. First, we considered a model including an index of bank competition, the Lerner index, and a dummy variable capturing the breakdown in pass-through implied by the crisis. Second, following preliminary results of the ECB (2013), we extended our baseline model by controlling for a number of country-specific factors that may have explained divergences between euro area countries in interest rate setting behaviour during the financial and sovereign crisis. To the best of our knowledge, our paper constitutes the first empirical study that investigates the role played by competition on the ECB's monetary transmission in times of crisis.
Considering six bank interest rates for a sample of eleven euro area countries, our empirical findings based on an ECM framework tend to confirm the important role played by bank competition in explaining the pass-through from money market rates to bank interest rates. Three main conclusions emerge from our analysis. First, results indicate that competition acts directly on the level of bank retail rates, since bank interest rate spreads are lower in more competitive markets. Second, from a monetary policy view, empirical evidence suggests that stronger bank competition reinforces the long-term interest pass-through. Competition improves monetary policy effectiveness. At last, we found that strengthening competition increases the immediate response of bank interest rates to changes in money market rates, even if results indicate heterogeneity between euro area countries. This is likely to increase the speed of adjustment. Consequently, heterogeneous market structures and competition evolution in euro area explain the divergent transmission intensity and speed.
Finally, empirical investigations conducted in the last section of this paper confirm the robustness of our results. Beyond robustness checks, we extended our empirical framework by introducing cyclical and other structural factors that may have affected the interest rate pass-though. We found that structural economic divergences between the EMU economies, amplified by the recent financial crisis, influenced the interest rate pass-through. Then, our results showed that financial sector health (systemic risk, banking stability and bank capitalization) has also played a significant role on interest pass-through. However, competition effects on pass-through are not affected by these new factors.
Our results are particularly relevant for economic policy for at least two reasons. First, since the level of bank competition matters for interest rate pass-through and therefore, for monetary policy transmission, monetary policy authorities have incentive to foster competition in eurozone. To date, the ECB cannot directly influence competition in the eurozone. However, ECB will earn in the coming months supervisory powers of individual banks in the context of banking union. Supervisory powers could allow influencing bank competition, that why it is important there are no trade-off between bank competition and monetary policy transmission. Here, we note no contradictory eurozone objectives. Second, our results underline the necessity of a market structures convergence in the eurozone to insure homogeneous monetary transmission between the different EMU countries. Reinforce financial integration within euro area countries is able to harmonize the level of bank competition in eurozone.
One of the major issues is that the new levers of action are relatively limited. In the past, some measures of integration did not produce the expected results. For instance, the EMU establishment and the deregulation of financial services in European Union allowed creating a theoretically level playing field. This would allow removing national entry barriers, fostering competition and creating a single banking market. Nearly fifteen years after the creation of the EMU, we can note that these targets have not been achieved. One of the perverse effects of these regulatory evolutions was to foster consolidation in banking sector. Consequently, over the period competition has not been improved. To the contrary, competition decreased in eurozone without real cross-border competition. After the crisis, the question of national retrenchment is more pregnant and could damage competition.
The complacent of competition regulators (with mergers, abuse of position dominant or some forms of cartels) and European commission could be explained by the potential trade-off between banking competition and stability, and competition and efficiency. A lower competition can also result of competition distortions caused by inadequate prudential regulation, which has fostered consolidation. Unfortunately Basel III fixes only partially this problem.
The current legislative and regulatory framework to ensure banking competition seems to be relatively complete. The apparent inefficiency of this legislative and regulatory framework could be explained by the specificities of banking sector and especially its link to systemic risk and instability. However, one axis of legislative and regulatory framework seems to be still lacking: consumer protection 20 . European directives in this sense could strengthen and harmonize banking competition.
20 The Liikanen report (2012) notes that national "self-regulatory measures have proven to be insufficient". Note: Long-run coefficients reported are those obtained from baseline model without competition index. 
Appendix B. Heterogeneity of the long-term pass-through

